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 EU Competition Policy: Algorithmic 
Collusion in the Digital Single Market 
Alexander Stewart-Moreno 
 
Abstract 
E-commerce promises a digital environment with ‘more perfect’ 
market characteristics. Although consumers may benefit from 
digital efficiencies, firms’ exploitation of such benefits may 
require new policy to regulate in line with the European 
Commission’s Digital Single Market Strategy. Price-setting 
algorithms are central to this dichotomy, as faster and more 
transparent pricing strategies could conceivably maintain 
algorithmic price-fixing cartels – which Article 101 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union may prove inadequate 
in tackling. This paper looks to remedy a perceived failure in the 
literature to appreciate the legal and economic analysis necessary 
to inform an alternative policy. It will assess the anti-competitive 
impact of pricing algorithms by contrasting the online and offline 
economic environments against which policy is set. It will 
evaluate the effectiveness of current policy in tackling explicit 
and tacit algorithmic collusion, accounting for its impact upon 
reasonable business practices, consumer welfare, liability and 
enforcement, and legal concepts which can be difficult to apply 
to the digital market. As long-term consumer welfare could be 
sacrificed by enforcing short-term remedies, it is advised that 
policy returns to its ordoliberal roots: prioritising the 
maintenance of healthy competition over current welfare-first 
economics which lack sufficient clarity to regulate algorithms. 
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1! Introduction 
In 2015, the Juncker Commission announced a Ôconnected digital single 
marketÕ1 (DSM) to promote access to goods, facilitate networks, and 
maximise economic growth. 2  Requiring the Ôrapid removal of key 
differences between the online and offline worlds to break down 
barriers to cross-border online activityÕ, 3  it looked to promote and 
protect businesses and consumers. Predictably, competition policy will 
enjoy a digital transmutation as the free market remains prone to failure. 
 
Pricing algorithms may expedite this failure, as their structural 
characteristics could facilitate anti-competitive behaviour in e-
commerce. An Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) report broadly outlined potential policy 
directions to protect consumer welfare, 4  but the literature does not 
substantively develop legal, economic, and commercial depth. This 
paper looks to fulfil this gap, to advocate a single policy direction for 
the European Union. 
 
In Section 2 of this article, the legal and economic definitions of 
collusion are outlined Ð applying them to the offline and online 
economies. It explores their respective characteristics, within which 
pricing algorithms illustrate and facilitate the latter in being Ômore 
perfectÕ. Sections 3 and 4 apply the two relevant models of collusive 
behaviour: explicit and tacit. These sections define both models and 
outline if and how these models should be captured by competition 
policy, accounting for commercial and consumer welfare and the 
applicability of existing legal concepts to them. In each case, a relevant 
policy direction will be proposed. 
 
1 European Commission, ‘A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe’ (COM 2015) 
192. 
2 ibid. 
3 ibid. 
4 OECD, ‘Algorithms and Collusion: Competition Policy in the Digital Age’ (OECD, 
2017). 
51  Volume I – Spring 2020 
2! The Digital Economic Foundation 
As competition lawyers must understand economic concepts, the legal 
impact of pricing algorithms could not be reasonably analysed without 
first examining the economic foundations of online and offline markets. 
The DSM presumes an initial distinction between markets to 
harmonise, requiring a comparative analysis of them to distinguish how 
collusion manifests in each instance, and expose the legal challenges to 
resolve. 
2.1! Defining collusion 
Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU) prohibits  
 
all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations 
of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade 
between Member States and which have as their object or effect 
the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition.5  
 
This includes, most importantly for the purposes of this paper, 
agreements having the object or effect of ‘directly or indirectly fixing 
… selling prices’ in the form of price-fixing cartels.6 This invites the 
attention of competition authorities to impose heavy sanctions without 
the need to prove the existence, or extent, of market impact as a matter 
of policy. 
 
Nevertheless, collusion is a fundamentally economic policy described 
by economists as ‘co-ordination … among competing firms with the 
objective of raising profits to a higher level than the non-cooperative 
equilibrium.’7  To coordinate in this way, cartelists must agree to a 
common policy, monitoring their mutual adherence, and consequently 
 
5 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (entered into force on 1 December 
2009), art 101(1).  
6 ibid art 101(1)(a). 
7 OECD (n 4). 
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punishing firms who deviate.8 Conceptualised by Merrill Flood and 
Melvin Dresher at the RAND Corporation, this may be understood with 
reference to the Prisoners’ Dilemma:9 a game theory model with two 
separately interrogated prisoners. Each are presented the option to 
defect, reducing their sentence whilst increasing that of the other, or to 
cooperate. The caveat is that, if both defect, the sentence will be worse 
than had they both cooperated.10 Figure 1 expresses this. 
 
 
 Cooperate Defect 
Cooperate -1 -1 -3 0 
Defect 0 -3 -2 -2 
 
Figure 1. Prisoners’ Dilemma 
 
Game theory dictates that as defecting offers a greater reward than 
cooperating, rational parties will each do so (i.e. a defect–defect 
scenario). This is defined as the Nash Equilibrium, being the strategy in 
which neither player is incentivised to deviate from their strategic 
decision having considered their opponent’s likely choice, which we 
have established is to defect.11 This is considered the dominant strategy. 
Nevertheless, the cooperate–cooperate scenario is logically the superior 
choice: the outcome cannot be improved without causing detriment to 
the other player – known as pareto optimality.12 This illustrates the 
achievement of a common, collusive policy. It is apparent that players 
in a non-oligopolistic market – that is, one not dominated by only a very 
small number of firms – are unlikely to cooperate ‘naturally’ at the risk 
of being worse off – unless they are able to communicate between 
 
8 ibid. 
9 Merrill Flood, ‘Some Experimental Games’ (1958) 5(1) Management Science 5. 
10 Albert Tucker, ‘The Mathematics of Tucker: A Sampler’ (1983) 14(3) The Two-Year 
College Mathematics Journal 228, 228. 
11 Flood (n 9) 11–17. 
12 Tucker (n 10). 
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‘rounds’ of the game to establish this pareto-optimal common policy.13 
Consequently, the TFEU does not make illegal pareto optimality, but 
the means by which it is achieved. To this end, in practice, the European 
Commission has expansively defined communication, the means of 
forming an agreement contrary to the TFEU, as ‘the existence of a 
concurrence of wills … the form in which it is manifested being 
unimportant so long as it constitutes the faithful expression of the 
parties’ intention’ 14  – significantly broader than its counterpart in 
contract law.  
 
Cartels are inherently unstable. The Prisoners’ Dilemma demonstrates 
that by defecting in a cooperate–cooperate scenario, a firm can 
maximise individual profits in the short-term by decreasing its price to 
attract consumers.15 Observing a multiple-round Prisoners’ Dilemma, 
Rapoport developed the tit-for-tat model to illustrate consequent 
behaviour. Upon defection from a cooperative equilibrium, co-cartelists 
will mimic this action by also defecting, causing Nash Equilibrium to 
be restored (defect–defect) and the cheating party being punished with 
reduced profits. 16  This creates a punishment scheme to maintain a 
collusive equilibrium. Accordingly, cartelists will return to the 
cooperate–cooperate scenario producing the mutually more favourable 
outcome.17 Nevertheless, competition authorities will typically seek to 
exploit these transient instabilities: observing them through market 
changes or expediting defections with the promise of leniency 
programmes if firms agree to ‘blow the whistle’ on cartel activities.18 
 
13 Flood (n 9) 24–26. 
14 Case T-41/96 Bayer v Commission [2000] II-03383 [69]. 
15 Jurgen Jaspers, ‘Managing Cartels: how Cartel Participants Create Stability in the 
Absence of law’ (2016) 23(3) European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research 319, 
321. 
16  Anatol Rapoport, ‘Escape from Paradox’ (1967) 217(1) Scientific American 50, 
practicably applied in Robert Axelrod, ‘Effective Choice in the Prisoner’s Dilemma’ 
(1980) 24(2) The Journal of Conflict Resolution 3, 7–8. 
17 ibid. 
18 Jaspers (n 15) 320. 
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2.2! Imperfect competition and offline collusion 
The traditional conception of perfect competition in an offline market 
is one in which buyers and sellers each have perfect knowledge and 
rational decision-making, with businesses maximising profits and 
consumers maximising utility.19 This is achieved from a homogenous 
product market of countless firms individually unable to influence 
market conditions due to the rapidity at which reactions occur to sustain 
the equilibrium.20 It is apparent that offline markets are not perfect, for 
which reason regulation exists; but more competitive behaviour may be 
observed from firms competing to lower prices, improve quality and 
choice, and innovate to attract demand. Consequently, perfect 
competition may be better framed in terms of maximising allocative 
and productive efficiency. 
 
Allocative efficiency refers to the point in which it is impossible to 
benefit any one party without causing detriment to another. If goods are 
allocated to consumers according to the price they are willing to pay, 
price equals marginal cost. The supplier will continue to earn more by 
producing an additional unit of its good until the production cost 
exceeds the gained revenue. On a supply and demand curve, this would 
correspond to supply equals demand.21 
 
Long term, markets must also be productively efficient, with goods 
produced at the lowest cost. Competitors entering a market may 
compete by undercutting. The more efficient a business is, the lower it 
can set its prices until they coincide with average costs.22 At this point, 
allocative and productive efficiency are equal, indicating perfect 
competition.23 
 
19 Libby Rittenberg, Principles of Microeconomics (1st edn, Flat World Knowledge 
2008) 140. 
20  Nathalie Berta and others, ‘On Perfect Competition: Definitions, Usages and 
Foundations’ (2012) 63(2) Papers in Political Economy 7, 10–13. 
21 Richard Whish and David Bailey, Competition Law (9th edn, OUP 2018) 5–6. 
22 ibid 6. 
23 ibid. 
55  Volume I – Spring 2020 
 
EU competition policy has demonstrated its preference towards short-
term allocative efficiency ‘as a means of enhancing consumer welfare 
and ensuring an efficient allocation of resources’, 24  from which 
productive efficiencies will presumably derive. Consumer welfare is 
negatively impacted where goods are allocated and maintained as a 
collusive equilibrium, above the prices consumers would be willing to 
pay – resulting in a producer surplus referred to as supra-competitive 
profits. Accordingly, competition law looks to ensure that firms cannot 
reach a common price-fixing policy, and instead focuses their attention 
on individual profits in competition with each other. 
2.3! Perfect competition and algorithmic collusion 
Pricing algorithms are indicative and symptomatic of the efficiencies 
presented by the online market. The OECD defines numerous forms of 
the technology. Pricing algorithms are here understood as automated 
digital tools able to monitor market data and optimise pricing strategies 
by reacting faster to changes, thereby incurring lower costs than human 
agents.25 With the right optimisation, they can be not only reactive, but 
anticipatory.  
 
Two characteristics must be drawn from this: market transparency and 
reaction speeds. These are conducive to achieving a ‘more perfect’ 
model of competition according to the types of efficiency mentioned 
above, taking the form of dynamic pricing. On the demand-side, 
algorithms are able to monitor changes in consumer demand to adjust 
prices accordingly. 26  On the supply side, companies are able to 
efficiently react to changes – such as availability, capacity, and 
competitors’ prices – reducing overall costs compared to brick-and-
 
24 Neelie Kroes, ‘European Competition Policy – Delivering Better Markets and Better 
Choices’ (Speech/05/512, 15 September 2005) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_SPEECH-05-512_en.htm?locale=en> accessed 5 February 2019.!
25 OECD (n 4) 8–12. 
26 ibid 17–18. 
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mortar operations.27 Consequently, the online market is brought closer 
to perfect competition as supply satisfies demand, and equilibrium is 
maintained in line with changing market conditions. 
 
The facilitation of perfect competition presumes firms’ goodwill 
towards allocative efficiency; supra-competitive profits may still be 
achieved where a common policy is established between competitors. 
Indeed, pricing algorithms do nothing to disincentivise the 
establishment of a collusive equilibrium. Rather, they can stabilise 
cartels by monitoring co-cartelists’ adherence to common policy. This 
enables cartelists to retaliate in real-time to restore or maintain supra-
competitive equilibrium. 28  Consequently, cartelists can more easily 
circumvent authorities’ market observations. The legal implications of 
this will be explored with reference to the two relevant models of 
collusion which are relevant to this paper and competition policy: 
explicit and tacit.  
 
Consequently, under a formulaic comparison of the online and offline 
markets, the former seems nearer to ‘perfect’ market conditions. The 
characteristics applied via pricing algorithms, which may conceive 
perfect competition, can easily be exploited towards collusive ends, 
which may exacerbate existing problems in the offline market. A 
careful balance between policy that is too stringent or too lax must be 
struck in order to regulate pricing algorithms. Indeed, the former may 
negatively impact the functioning and efficiency of the free market and 
long-term consumer benefit, whilst the latter risks consumer welfare in 
the short term. This paper will examine each model of collusion, 
relevant to the behaviour between direct competitors, to discern how 
the negative impact of each may be mitigated whilst ensuring the 
dynamic benefits promised to consumers. 
 
 
27 ibid 15–16. 
28 ibid. 
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3! Explicit collusion 
Judicial treatment of pricing algorithms in the EU has proven tame. The 
few cases considered by competition authorities and the courts have 
involved challenges where collusion is explicitly apparent. These cases 
are useful for two reasons, however: they are indicative of current 
policy in application and they present arguments that call into question 
the viability of policymakers’ discretion. This section will illustrate 
these limitations and issues with reference to the most relevant case to-
date: the UK’s Competition and Market Authority’s (CMA) 
investigation into Trod Ltd.29 
3.1! Judicial review of Trod Ltd 
Trod Ltd was fined £163,371 for colluding with GB Posters to fix prices 
on Amazon Marketplace. Discovered only due to the latter’s 
whistleblowing, the case is not controversial in its legal application. 
Employees from both companies had agreed to not undercut each 
other’s prices, and to “raise maxi posters to £3.94 or 25p below cheapest 
seller [sic]” and set the ‘lowest maxi posters price to £2.59’.30 Soon, 
they each began to employ third-party pricing algorithms to streamline 
the process. Communication further demonstrated failures between 
parties to adhere to their common policy,31 and the threat that deviation 
could be punished by ceasing use of the algorithm to ‘go back to square 
1 and sell all [of your] posters at a loss’.32 Consequently, it seems that 
the requirements of supra-competitive equilibrium were present and 
were easily captured and penalised by the CMA under their otherwise 
‘offline’ competition policy. The ease of this approach veils significant 
concern – wherein superficial analysis is at odds with the effective 
enforcement of competition policy for even the most simplistic of 
algorithmic cartels. 
 
29 Competition and Markets Authority, ‘Online Sales of Posters and Frames’ (2016) 
Case 50223. 
30 ibid [3.58]. 
31 ibid [3.82]. 
32 ibid [3.60]. 
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3.2! Agreement and concerted practices 
There is no doubting in Trod that common policy can be established 
just as well online as offline. The LIBOR Scandal, which came to its 
peak in 2008, saw several financial institutions fraudulently manipulate 
the daily interest rates at which they borrow from each other. As these 
rates underpin derivatives trading, the banks could profit by artificially 
inflating or deflating the LIBOR rate – in the process, distorting the 
market. They did so by communicating over an online chatroom.33 
Consequently, whether firms are communicating in person or online is 
not an issue, so much as there being evidence that common policy has 
been explicitly agreed, as it was in Trod via email correspondence. 
 
The CMA also perceived in Trod ‘a coordination of conduct between 
them in which they knowingly substituted practical cooperation 
between them for the risks of competition’.34 Frequently adopting a 
dual-classification with agreement, concerted practices lack individual 
definition.35 Indeed, it has been treated more as a ‘catch-all’ where ‘the 
Commission cannot be expected to classify the infringement 
precisely’.36 Nevertheless, Suiker Unie v Commission37 established that 
a plan is not required, provided there has been sufficient contact that 
could influence market conduct. Although the dual classification was 
adopted in Trod – suggesting the court errs towards the clarity of 
‘agreement’ – the capacity for algorithms to facilitate concerted 
practices may necessitate its proper definition, or at least an 
understanding as to when it may apply alone.  
 
 
33 Ricardo Cardoso and Yizhou Ren, ‘Antitrust: Commission Fines Crédit Agricole, 
HSBC and JPMorgan Chase €485 Million for Euro Interest Rate Derivatives Cartel’ 
(European Commission, 7 December 2016) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-
16-4304_en.htm> accessed 26 November 2018. 
34 Trod Ltd (n 29) [5.17]. 
35 See, for example, Whish and Bailey (n 21) 532, in which concerted practices are 
considered only by their dual classification with agreement. 
36 PVC (Case IV/31.865) Commission Decision 89/190/EEC [1989] OJ L 74/1. 
37 Case C-40/73 Suiker Unie v Commission [1975] I-01663, 1697–1698. 
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One example of how concerted practice may arise was noted by the 
European Commission in its contributory notes to the OECD, noting 
that signalling pricing strategies to competitors through algorithms may 
fall within the scope of Article 101.38 This was raised in Container 
Shipping, wherein carriers would issue announcements of their pricing 
intentions weeks before their implementation. The Commission held 
that this was of little use to consumers, but ‘may constitute … a more 
subtle way for competitors to collude and replace competition with 
practical cooperation’.39 Having been settled outside of proceedings, 
the Commission was unable to definitively rule upon this issue, 
although Camesaca and Grelier argue that this case represents the ‘next 
step’ in its expansionism towards stricter treatment of price signalling 
and concertation.40  
 
However, Camesaca and Grelier fail to distinguish between public and 
private pricing transparency. The unilateral nature of public 
transparency – due to its accessibility by consumers and lack of direct 
communication between competitors – is difficult to hold as explicit 
collusion (although will be relevant to tacit collusion).41 In contrast, 
encoding and decoding hidden data is a de facto bilateral exchange of 
private information,42 removing consumers from the market equation. 
Thus, whereas Camesaca and Grelier are suspicious of the 
Commission’s widening regulatory exposure against the tide of 
previous case law, it is likely that Container Shipping merely offers a 
recalibration of the careful balance to be drawn. Short of conclusions 
actually being made, its relevance to public price announcements is 
 
38 OECD, ‘Algorithms and Collusion - Note from the European Union’, (OECD, 2017) 
[27]. 
39 Container Shipping (Case AT.39850) Commission Decision 2016/C 327/04 [2016] 
OJ C 327/4. 
40  Peter Camesasca and Laurie-Anne Grelier, ‘Close Your Eyes? Navigating the 
Tortuous Waters of Conscious Parallelism and Signalling in the European Union’ 
(2016) 7(9) Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 599, 605.  
41 OECD, ‘Unilateral Disclosure of Information with Anticompetitive Effects’ (OECD, 
2012) [58]. 
42 ibid [33]. 
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questionable. Nevertheless, though public announcements may 
therefore escape liability, the same cannot be said for covert bilateral 
exchanges.  
 
This is demonstrable from a US Department of Justice case in 1992: 
suing eight carriers for price-fixing through digital and algorithmic 
means. The Airline Tariff Publishing Company collected fare 
information from the airlines and disseminated it to all other airlines 
and reservation systems that would serve travel agents.43 As this system 
was publicly available, from a consumer perspective, at first glance it 
appears very similar to unilateral transparency. The facts of the case 
saw airlines communicating through encoded footnote designators, 
employing algorithms to process presented fare information, monitor 
competitors’ responses, and consequently negotiate higher fares, 
retaliating against any airlines who would diverge from them. Such 
communication was relatively costless and could neither be said to 
present an agreement in the same way as direct communication, nor 
benefit consumers through public transparency. 
 
Economists refer to this costless, private communication as ‘cheap 
talks’. Evidently, it has been captured under US antitrust policy, so it is 
not inconceivable that it would be caught by Article 101 TFEU in the 
same way. Nevertheless, economists disagree as to the extent to which 
this method in fact engenders collusion. In T-Mobile Netherlands it was 
suggested “that the exchange of information between competitors is 
liable to be incompatible with the competition rules if it reduces or 
removes the degree of uncertainty as to the operation of the market in 
question.”44 By their nature, cheap talks are costless, non-binding, and 
unverifiable.45 Baliga and Morris therefore suggest that they are self-
defeating to the ends of establishing or maintaining coordination. When 
applied to the Prisoners’ Dilemma, cheap talks are likely to be ignored 
 
43 United States v Airline Tariff Publishing Company 836 F Supp 9 (1993). 
44 Case C-8/08 T-Mobile Netherlands and Others [2009] I-04529 [35]. 
45  Joseph Farrell, ‘Cheap Talk, Coordination, and Entry’ (1987) 18(1) The RAND 
Journal of Economics 34, 34. 
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(resulting in a defect–defect scenario) in favour of Nash Equilibrium. 
In most instances, there is little to suggest cheap talks will result in 
collusion, as they fail to reduce uncertainty. Cooper and others note the 
applicability of cheap talks to the Battle of the Sexes, a coordination 
game illustrative of the presumption towards collusive behaviour in this 
scenario. The game imagines that a husband and wife would each prefer 
a different activity but would rather do something together (i.e. the 
same activity) than apart (i.e. two different activities). Demonstrated in 
Figure 2, the two Nash Equilibria (0,0) demonstrate how cheap talks, 
as ex ante communication, may allow firms to indicate a preferred 
focus, towards which others are inclined to create a common policy.46 
 
 Opera Football 
Opera 3 2 0 0 
Football 0 0 2 3 
Figure 2. Battle of the Sexes 
 
Whilst the Battle of the Sexes is a likely model for oligopolistic 
markets, with few competitors, Farrell notes that parties’ motivations in 
this game would ‘apply equally [when] … bargaining under complete 
information’.47 These conditions are fulfilled with pricing algorithms, 
as their ability to monitor an increasingly transparent digital market 
means that cheap talks become more verifiable – and so trusted by 
would-be cartelists. In this instance, verification would be tantamount 
to a bilateral exchange. Cooper and others corroborated this. In 
simulations of the Battle of the Sexes, they had one player express their 
intentions to the other: suggesting a focal equilibrium. The other player 
would frequently select that option, apparently resolving the 
coordination problem in the Prisonner’s Dilemma. To better simulate 
the ‘real’ markets, however, they then allowed both players to 
 
46 Russel Cooper and others, ‘Communication in the Battle of the Sexes Game: Some 
Experimental Results’ (1989) 20(4) The RAND Journal of Economics 568, 569.  
47 Farrell (n 45). 
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communicate simultaneously. This resulted in some confusion amongst 
players to establish a focal equilibrium, but after a series of messages 
to-and-from resulted in consistent coordination.48 Where the ECJ in 
Dole Food Company 49  ruled that behaviour which ‘reduces … the 
degree of uncertainty … of the market’ would be incompatible with 
competition rules, algorithms’ ability to verify cheap talks would fall 
well within this threshold. The conduct of competitors cannot be 
privately foreseeable at the expense of public accessibility.  
 
With offline policy sufficient in most respects, agreement and its dual 
classification with concerted practices retain their low thresholds for 
capture. It is the latter, when treated in isolation such as with respect to 
price signalling, that must be better defined by competition policy. 
Although unilateral signals are a matter best confined to discussions on 
tacit collusion, bilateral exchanges of information facilitated by 
algorithms comply more readily with the economic rationale 
underpinning Article 101 TFEU and the Dole Food Company criterion. 
Current policy in this respect is adequate, but the procedural issues 
around detecting such practices remain open to question. 
3.3! Agency and liability  
VM Remonts50 extended the single economic unit doctrine from Becu,51 
wherein the anti-competitive actions of employees were sufficient to 
trigger Article 101 as they are incorporated within the same entity, to 
include independent service providers acting under an undertaking’s 
direction. Consequently, establishing liability in this instance is 
uncontroversial even if an algorithm were said to be a separate actor to 
the firm. Nevertheless, the CMA admitted to being unable to determine 
the extent to which cartelists in Trod had benefited due to the 
 
48 Cooper and others (n 46). 
49 Case C-286/13 P Dole Food and Dole Fresh Fruit Europe v Commission [2015] 
ECLI:EU:C 184. 
50 Case C-542/14 VM Remonts and Others v Konkurences padome [2016] ECLI:EU:C 
[33]. 
51 Case C-22/98 Becu and Others [1999] I-05665. 
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algorithms’ intermediary position.52  Although it was suggested that 
prices had increased by 20% over the relevant period,53 automation 
ensured that cartelists need not monitor price changes short of a failure 
to adhere to their common policy. Although the EU Fines Notice omits 
the calculation of firms’ benefit, it implies a ‘profits-plus’ approach as 
disgorging profitability, reflecting seriousness of the infringement, plus 
a deterrent amount. It was admitted in KME Germany v Commission 
that current turnover-based fines are ‘vague and imperfect’. 54 
Nevertheless, it upheld its adequacy, which Riley lambasts: ‘turnover 
is an inadequate proxy for assessing the damage done by price-fixing 
or the gain acquired by undertakings’. 55  Indeed, the Commission’s 
approach has been to impose up to 30% of turnover in the relevant 
markets as the basic fine, which it argues captures cartels’ overcharge 
typically being within a 15–25% ‘entry fee’. 56 Ehmer and Rosati have 
challenged this estimate, with a breadth of gains significantly above and 
below these overcharges. They suggest that less-complex cartels may 
be deterred by lower fines; 57  but as algorithmic collusion is more 
complex and more sustainable, higher penalties are required to offset 
greater profitability and ensure deterrent effect.  
 
Trod’s consequent fall into administration may veil the insufficiency of 
current policy, particularly where proportionality must be considered. 
It is difficult to suggest what may have occurred under alternative 
policy, particularly where its basic fine of £50,000–£100,000 enjoyed a 
 
52 viz ibid [6.2.1]; Mark Tricker and others, ‘Online Retailers should Tread Carefully 
after Trod’ (Norton Rose Fulbright Knowledge, November 2016) 
<https://www.nortonrosefulbright.com:443/en-
us/knowledge/publications/7e7bdcca/online-retailers-should-tread-carefully-after-
trod> accessed 29 November 2019.!
53 Trod Ltd (n 29) [6.21]. 
54 Case T-127/04 KME Germany and Others v Commission [2009] ECLI:EU:T 142. 
55 Alan Riley, Modernising Cartel Sanctions: Effective Sanctions for Price Fixing in the 
European Union (2011) 32(11) European Competition Law Review 551, 553. 
56  Neelie Kroes, ‘Private and Public Enforcement of EU Competition Law’ (IBA 
Conference, Brussels, March 2009). 
57  Christian Ehmer and Francesco Rosati, ‘Science, Myth and Fines: Do Cartels 
Typically Raise Prices by 25%?’ (2009) 4 Concurrences 4, [20]. 
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40–60% reduction, but it inarguably falls victim to a ‘mechanistic’ 
process.58 Nevertheless, accounting for the failures of turnover-based 
fines, a more forensic, audited approach would treat proportionality 
holistically. Thus, where an assessment of company assets, liability, 
equity, income, and cash flows is considered, a more effective 
framework could be constructed to disgorge supra-competitive profits 
whilst achieving optimal deterrence within undertakings’ capacities to 
pay. This retains the spirit of the Fines Notice whilst accounting for the 
issues of monitoring algorithms’ real-time gains. 
 
Additionally, it brings the Fines Notice under the purview of certainty. 
Current policy sees the basic fine capable of being increased or 
decreased taking into account gravity, duration, and any other relevant 
factors. To this end, the ‘assessment of fines, rather than being a 
mathematical exercise based on an abstract formula, involves a legal 
and economic appraisal’, lacking a specific methodology by which to 
justify fines, which are subject to change at any time.59 This is not 
novel; the court’s judgment in BPB v Commission60 suggests that by 
wilfully propagating uncertainty, consumer welfare is protected by 
undertakings’ aversion to an inability to make a cost-benefit analysis. 
This approach is highly suspect, as risk aversion and consumer welfare 
are not inextricably linked. A Bank of Greece working paper suggested 
that uncertainty would see undeterred cartels pricing higher than they 
would have otherwise, whilst others are deterred from socially benign 
actions for fear of punishment.61 This would be tantamount to deeming 
algorithms anti-competitive suo jure. Consequently, certainty in 
punishment is concerning; uncertainty is likely to incentivise 
algorithmic cartels whilst deterring algorithms’ economic benefits in 
the DSM. 
 
58 Riley (n 55) 554. 
59  Ivo Van Bael, ‘Fining à la Carte: The Lottery of EU Competition Law’ (1995) 
16(4) European Competition Law Review 237. 
60 Case T-53/03 BPB v Commission [2008] II-01333 [336]. 
61  Vasiliki Bageri and others, ‘The Distortive Effects of Antitrust Fines Based on 
Revenue’ (2013) 123(572) The Economic Journal 545, 556.  
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The suitability of an audited approach to algorithmic cartels cannot be 
understated. Trod’s experience, being the singular example, may prove 
an effective deterrence. Equally, it may offer authorities a false sense 
of security in the adequacy of current policy. Companies may tighten 
their regulatory compliance and promote awareness where initial 
liability cannot be removed by degrees of separation, but so must 
legislators more effectively scrutinise cartels to realistically and 
proportionally deter them. Although Trod was an open-and-shut case, 
current policy may be damned where cartels perfect their separation 
through more stable algorithms requiring less intervention. If detection 
and profitability enjoy an inversely proportional relationship, 
authorities must have the capacity to improve their monitoring of price 
fluctuations and, to ensure compliance, adopt a penalty framework with 
a certain cost-benefit analysis, whereby supra-competitive prices are 
punished. 
4! Tacit collusion 
As explicit collusion is illegal in the offline markets, this paper could 
analyse its transplantation to the digital economy with a presumption of 
illegality. The same cannot be said of tacit collusion. The phenomenon 
is sufficiently rare that EU competition policy has not been compelled 
to tackle it: it is presently legal (or not illegal). As pricing algorithms 
risk tacit collusion becoming a mainstream issue, this paper will explore 
if, and how, it may be brought within the scope of competition policy. 
It will do so with reference to the oligopoly problem from which tacit 
collusion derives and which pricing algorithms emulate. It will consider 
the solutions proposed by academics from various schools of economic 
thought to resolving this problem. Deeming them insufficient to solving 
the issue presented by pricing algorithms, however, this paper will 
advocate an ordoliberal approach to empower both competition 
authorities and commercial parties. Simultaneously, the burden of proof 
can be shifted to ensure their structural symmetry in the proposed legal 
landscape. 
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4.1! The economics of the oligopology problem 
The OECD outlines that pricing algorithms will widen the scope of tacit 
collusion from ‘oligopolistic markets with high barriers to entry and a 
high degree of transparency’ to those for which it would be otherwise 
unsustainable.62 Typically, an oligopolistic market is one characterised 
by few competitors, naturally reducing competition. This is not 
problematic per se, but their proximity can inform their pricing 
strategies towards common policy without bilateral communication or 
concertation – and so, without any agreement or concerted practice, 
cannot fall within the scope of the TFEU.63 Pricing algorithms emulate 
oligopolies’ salient features: high transparency resulting in mutual self-
awareness and the expectation of swift retaliation. The problem is 
exacerbated by a market of many interdependent suppliers, in which it 
may be commercially illogical to not account for competitors’ prices, 
thus creating an inherent cooperate–cooperate scenario. To ignore 
competitors’ prices may be tantamount to defection, inviting tit-for-tat 
fluctuations between profit and loss. Consequently, the market 
functions as though there were collusion, albeit inadvertently given the 
absence of an agreement or bilateral process by which to reach it. As 
pricing algorithms possess these same salient features, the risk is that 
supra-competitive profits become a ‘normal’ market condition within 
the DSM. 
 
The inaction and indecision of the law towards the oligopoly problem 
is due to the lack of viable remedies, being inescapable under present 
market conditions. The Commission and ECJ have been more prone to 
disproving oligopolies, as a defence, than attaching liability to them.64 
Although algorithms offer comparable structural concerns, such a 
widespread issue cannot be ignored, necessitating an appropriate 
remedial scheme in the DSM. 
 
62 OECD (n 4). 
63 Whish and Bailey (n 21) 572. 
64  Case 48-69 Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd v European Commission [1972] 
ECLI:EU:C 70; Case C-89/85 Ahlström Osakeyhtiö and Others v Commission [1994] 
I-00099; Case C-359/01 British Sugar plc v European Commission [2004] I-04933. 
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4.2! Proposals from the Harvard and Chicago schools 
It is unsurprising that Salil Mehra cautions that ‘[b]lack-letter law's 
blind spot … may become a cloaking device behind which algorithmic 
price coordination can readily hide’.65 This necessitates the expansion 
of ‘agreement’, as contained in Article 101 TFEU, to deny this exploit. 
Unsurprisingly, this has been met with increasing resistance from 
liberal economists. Professor Donald Turner argued that 
interdependence is an inescapable truth of oligopolistic – or, as it 
applies to this case, algorithmic – market structures. A ‘rational [party] 
… simply takes one more factor into account – the reactions of his 
competitors to any price change that he makes’.66 This is defensible on 
two grounds: firstly, it ensures commercial freedom, and secondly, 
enforcement would be infeasible. Generally, this approach aligns with 
Chicagoan economics, conceiving a free market which, as Read 
describes, has ‘its own rationality’67 so should enjoy laissez-faire non-
interventionism from the state. 
 
Consequent ‘neoliberal’ thought celebrates the rationality of economic 
agents to ‘produce’ and ‘consume’, and views freedom to contract as 
an extension of their rights to private property. 68  Indeed, Demsetz 
empirically demonstrated that firms’ ‘positive correlation between 
profit rates and concentration … should be expected from a workable 
incentive system that rewards superior performance’.69 Accordingly, it 
is natural that as rational-choice efficiency increases economic 
performance, it will be taken. The effect is therefore collusive, but the 
 
65 Salil Mehra, ‘Antitrust and the Robo-Seller: Competition in the Time of Algorithms’ 
(2016)] 100(4) Minnesota Law Review 1323, 1351. 
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Parallelism and Refusals to Deal’ (1962) 75(4) Harvard Law Review 655, 665. 
67 Jason Read, ‘A Genealogy of Homo-Economicus: Neoliberalism and the Production 
of Subjectivity’ (2009) 6 Foucault Studies 25, 27. 
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means are entirely inadvertent, if not unavoidable. Short of wilful 
communication, the state lacks the necessary justification to intervene. 
In doing so, Turner admits, it would be tantamount to requiring firms 
to ignore their competitors’ prices,70 with the line between collusive and 
rational decisions seemingly blurred. The irrationality of this approach 
is clearly undesirable: it is unfeasible and, by curtailing economic 
performance, would impact the welfare benefits achieved through 
innovation in the pursuit of profit. To do so would be, at best, 
unwarrantedly optimistic and, at worst, negligent. Consequently, a 
stronger economic framework is desirable to establish the bounds of 
rationality, for fear that unabated and/or inadvertent enterprise risks 
collusive equilibria.  
 
Turner’s stance suggests the Harvard Structure → Conduct → 
Performance (SCP) paradigm may offer a viable remedy to the 
oligopoly problem. In this, the conduct and consequent performance of 
firms cannot be faulted, it being an issue of market structure. The three 
are causally linked.71  By introducing ex ante structural remedies to 
prevent oligopolies from forming, therefore, the problem may be 
avoided. 72  Whilst not disagreeable, its applicability to algorithmic 
collusion is imperfect. As the requirement that there are few market 
players to engender tacit collusion is not necessarily true of algorithmic 
markets, the problem is less structural than behavioural. The two may 
not be mutually exclusive, however. The SCP paradigm may be 
applied, if not to the market, then to algorithms themselves, suggesting 
that their conduct is an encoded, structural attribute which leads to 
tacitly collusive outcomes. 
 
Harrington supports this conclusion, arguing that ‘collusion by 
autonomous agents is the use of pricing rules that embed a reward-
punishment scheme which supports supra-competitive prices’.73 The 
 
70 Turner (n 66) 669. 
71 Joe Bain, Barriers to New Competition (1st edn, Harvard University Press 1956). 
72 Turner (n 66) 671. 
73 Joseph Harrington, ‘Developing Competition Law for Collusion by Autonomous 
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concept of ‘agreement’, therefore, is supplanted by encoded behaviour 
to prompt effective price-fixing. He suggests that authorities audit the 
coding of algorithms to ascertain the programme which would punish 
another firm for deviating from the presumptive common policy of a 
highly transparent market (i.e. the oligopoly problem).74 In theory, this 
would reduce transparency as algorithms would not be monitoring and 
reacting to competitors’ strategies, making tacit cartels inherently 
unstable. Indeed, it may promote confidence in evidentiary standards: 
that certain encoded behaviours are per se illegal. Its viability, however, 
is doubtable; as Trod demonstrated, algorithms may fail to collude even 
where common policy had been explicitly agreed. 75  Consequently, 
whilst appreciative of such ex ante recourse, imposing algorithmic 
intent is difficult to justify. 
 
Alternatively, Ezrachi and Stucke propose an imposed ‘time lag’ to 
limit the speed of algorithms’ price changes.76 This approach indirectly 
disincentivises reward–punishment schemes, bypassing the weaknesses 
of Harrington’s proposal whilst also slowing the achievement of a 
stable supra-competitive equilibrium. This strategy was adopted by the 
Austrian Fuel Price Fixing Act 2009 (Spritpreisverordnung) where 
commercial fuel aptly illustrates conscious parallelism in practice.77 
Evanthia and Karsten conclude that the Act, which restricted fuel 
stations’ price increases to once per 24 hours, was a success as 
consumers’ search costs were reduced due to less price volatility.78 
 
Artificial Agents’ (2018) 14(3) Journal of Competition Law & Economics 331. 
74 ibid. 
75 Trod Ltd (n 29). 
76 Ariel Ezrachi and Maurice Stucke, Virtual Competition: the Promise and Perils of 
the Algorithm-driven Economy (1st edn, Harvard University Press 2016) 239–240. 
77 Attempts to litigate conscious parallelism in this sector have similarly failed: ‘plus 
factors’ such as high profits and prices, price uniformity, and parallel changes are 
deemed consistent with competition in this market structure, White v RM Packer Co 
635 F3d 571 (1st Cir 2011). 
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There are two issues with this approach, however: it would directly 
limit pro-competitive dynamic pricing by indirectly limiting anti-
competitive behaviour; and it would reduce consumer choice and 
information in deciding from whom to purchase. 79  Indeed, as 
algorithms actively monitor consumer demand, the welfare costs 
attached to price volatility are less relevant. Altogether, this proposal 
would simultaneously reduce pro-competitive effects and induce 
unwarranted, state-sponsored inefficiencies.  
 
Rejecting ex ante remedies as infeasible, Judge Posner – an American 
jurist, economist, and critic of Turner – argued that interdependence 
does not so much explain how sellers establish supra-competitive prices 
as why. He describes tacit collusion as ‘not an unconscious state’ but 
analogous to a unilateral contract, ‘treated by the law as a contract rather 
than as individual behaviour’. 80  Consequently, proper economic 
discovery may legitimise judicial enforcement. To a limited extent, this 
has already been reflected in Suiker Unie, wherein the ECJ admitted 
that 
 
…although it is correct to say that this requirement of 
independence does not deprive economic operators of the right 
to adapt themselves … [it precludes disclosing] the course of 
conduct which they themselves have decided to adopt or 
contemplate adopting.81  
 
Notably, it indicates the expansion of agreement would include price 
leadership which, in practice, may include public price announcements. 
Thus, although Shipping Containers failed to meet the threshold for 
explicit collusion, its unilateralism may be relevant to tacit scenarios. 
 
Public price announcements exist in a controversial grey area between 
 
79 OECD, ‘Competition Assessment Toolkit: Volume 1’ (OECD, 2017).  
80 Richard Posner, ‘Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach’ (1968) 
21 Stanford Law Review 1562, 1576. 
81 Suiker Unie (n 37) [174]. 
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anti-competitively revealing future prices to competitors and pro-
competitively reducing consumer search costs. Capobianco argues that, 
whilst current jurisprudence is at a balance teetering between them, 
practices would fall more determinately where they include‘an 
invitation to collude’.82 This approach is simplistic, even accounting for 
Posner’s argument: whilst Capobianco’s criteria may be demonstrative 
of anti-competitive practices and price leadership, an invitation is 
unlikely, if at all necessary. Public price announcements may require 
nothing more than the announcing party’s good reputation for 
competitors to adopt consciously parallel behaviour – the ‘acceptance’ 
of the unilateral ‘offer’ to collude. Dibadj is proactive in recognising 
the threat of conscious parallelism and the facilitatory role of public 
price announcements. In favour of the econometric methods developed 
by Posner, he suggests a ‘menu of remedies’, namely injunctions and 
structural remedies. 83  The latter has been discounted already, with 
reference to the SCP paradigm. Alternatively, injunctions could prove 
beneficial to establishing tolerable and predictable bounds to the 
rational conduct of firms in the free market. In the digital economy, 
however, this is unlikely to apply. Price signalling is conducive to 
achieving a common policy as it exposes intention; but as algorithms 
monitor the markets and react in real-time, the transparency those 
injunctions seek to resolve is effectively redundant. Injunctive 
remedies, therefore, make little headway in resolving the oligopoly 
problem of an algorithmic market.  
4.3! Post-Chicago: ‘Welfare first’ principles 
It is for these reasons that Posner admitted the infeasibility of state 
interventionism, which is particularly relevant to the difficulties 
attributable to the online market. 84  Kaplow, however, continues to 
 
82 Antonio Capobianco, ‘Unilateral Disclosure of Information with Anticompetitive 
Effects’ (OECD, 2012) [61]. (Emphasis in the original.) 
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lambast judicial reliance upon communication, as exonerating cases ‘on 
the ground that they involve mere interdependence are those that 
involve the greatest rather than the least social harm’.85 Mehra notes 
that the ‘robo-seller shifts the balance’ towards this Post-Chicagoan 
approach, given the expansion of tacit collusion.86 Whilst Posner sought 
to expand the definition of communication, therefore, Kaplow deems it 
dispensable, proposing a ‘direct approach’ which identifies a social 
problem, detects cartelists’ activities, and applies sanctions. 87  This 
‘welfare first’ approach risks casting the antitrust net too widely, at the 
expense of judicious enforcement against firms and the dynamic nature 
of the market.  
 
On the matter of detection, Kaplow argues that market patterns (price 
elevations, maintenance, and drops) and market structure inherently 
imply the presence of tacit collusion.88 Although these econometric 
suggestions are not dissimilar to Posner’s or Dibadj’s, his suggestion to 
‘combin[e] complementary types of evidence and [assign] different 
weights to each’89 is a highly arbitrary and pendulous reversal of the 
Chicagoan approach. Consequently, whilst Kaplow’s disaffection 
towards self-regulation as ‘one shoe fits all’ is well-founded, 
necessitating closer scrutiny of a complex market, his approach 
threatens to do more harm than good in casting the antitrust net too 
wide. 
 
The reason for this is that Kaplow identifies the social issue as 
preliminary. His approach ensures that ‘competition policy concerned 
with consumer [welfare] should optimally be more aggressive’, to 
 
85 Louis Kaplow, ‘On the Meaning of Horizontal Agreements in Competition Law’ 
(2011) 99(3) California Law Review 683, 689. 
86 Mehra (n 65) 1343. 
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88 ibid 468–470. 
89 Louis Kaplow, Competition Policy and Price Fixing (Princeton University Press 
2013) 248.  
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capture even smaller price elevations. 90  This demonstrably risks 
commercial freedoms as his apparent objection towards allocative 
inefficiencies errs towards Hutt’s so-called ‘sovereignty of the 
consumer’. This idea holds that ‘the sphere of freedom and power is 
that of the consumer, while the sphere of obedience and restriction is 
that of the producer’, which will, therefore, achieve market stability 
through consumers’ freedom of choice.91 Two issues may be illustrated 
from this: consumer sovereignty establishes, firstly, a continued 
intolerance of firms’ autonomy and, secondly, overzealous market 
control.  
 
Persky attempts to dilute the consumer sovereignty model by better 
defining production as the means and consumption as the end. 92 
Superficially, this does not appear wholly controversial; Pareto 
optimality is not dispensed with as, according to market forces, we may 
illustrate that it is supply that must meet demand – being the first to 
move. Although this may generally be the case, Gintis argues that social 
outcomes are the ‘reflection of individual preferences, constrained by 
available resources and knowledge of technologies’.93 The foresight of 
this approach, presumably, did not stretch to the concept of pricing 
algorithms, but adequately explains the relationship between ‘consumer 
sovereignty’ and a framework within which it exists, but no further than 
the bounds of supply-side efficiencies (or inefficiencies). Were we to 
treat Hutt’s suggestion as true, it would be tantamount to assuming an 
inelasticity of supply: price being determined only by the movement of 
demand. Firms would be little more than vehicles for social output, 
without incentive to innovate or provide economic growth. 
 
 
90 ibid 220. 
91 William Hutt, ‘The Concept of Consumers’ Sovereignty’ (1940) 50(1) The Economic 
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This argument rests upon the assumption that regulators, as conduits of 
consumer welfare, understand how best to maximise it. Regulating 
overzealously would see firms’ bondage to production; indicative of 
neo-Keynesian interventionism supporting the enforcement of a static, 
allocative equilibrium.94  This sets a dangerous precedent for short-
termism where algorithms’ predictive effects would have dynamic 
prices reflecting long-term efficiencies.95  Indeed, Gintis argues that 
‘technology … is constrained to those compatible with the reproduction 
of the social relations of capitalist production’. 96  Consequently, 
consumer sovereignty is not absolute: it is limited to means also in the 
interest of the producer. Where consumer welfare is protected too 
readily according to short-term inelasticity, firms will enjoy little 
incentive to develop supply-side efficiencies or technologies to create 
long-term price reductions. The causal relationship between supply and 
demand rejects the sovereignty of either. Instead, supply-side 
efficiencies present a framework to expand and accommodate 
consumer demand. Focusing so overtly upon short-term consumer 
protections would, therefore, jeopardise and restrict future efficiency 
and scope.  
 
These proposals from various economic schools have raised no 
justifiable conclusions. At risk of the oligopoly problem being 
exacerbated by pricing algorithms, policy must be reformulated. Every 
argument, however, has revolved around ideas of consumer welfare – 
being either too strong or too weak, with little commonality to find a 
middle ground. To this end, this paper proposes removing consumer 
welfare from immediate consideration. A seemingly radical proposal, 
Behren differentiates consumer welfare from consumer choice, 
replacing long-term speculation and short-term apprehension with 
 
94 John Hicks, ‘Mr Keynes and the “Classics”, A Suggested Interpretation’ (1937) 5(2) 
Econometrica 147, 157. 
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‘economic freedom of market agents within the framework of a market 
structure which is not constricted by producers at the expense of the 
alternatives.’ 97  Indeed, competition policy is framed by a static 
‘snapshot’ of allocative efficiency, to which ends pricing algorithms are 
both panacea and anathema – where it should appreciate long-term 
dynamic efficiencies. By escaping this consumer welfare paradigm, the 
protection of competition for the sake of competition should be 
reasserted – an approach indigenous to European policy in the form of 
ordoliberalism. 
4.4! Returning to ordoliberalism 
Ordoliberalism ‘advocates a state-regulated competitive process as a 
necessary instrument for the protection of individual economic 
freedom’.98 This is a model of social-liberalism through which strong 
macroeconomic rules ensure and protect microeconomic free-market 
competition.99  This philosophy informed the TFEU as an economic 
constitution which ‘defines the rules of the game under which economic 
activities can be carried out’.100 Indeed, the Commission has reflected 
this need ‘to protect … the structure of the market and, in so doing, 
competition as such’.101  
 
Ordoliberalism is not without detractors. Reflecting the Commission’s 
‘more-economic approach’, it is deemed overly formalistic, 102  with 
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established rules preventing a case-by-case economic analysis.103 This 
is, in part, true, but, in both respects, conducive to effectively 
countering algorithmic cartels. Anchustegui observes that 
ordoliberalism is not mutually exclusive with the Commission’s 
economic analysis, but ‘shapes and sets the rules of an institutional 
framework’ rather than being the policy in itself. 104  Consequently, 
ordoliberalism does not lack efficiency considerations, but recognises 
firms’ competitive output within that institutional framework rather 
than presuming that case-by-case micro-economic inefficiencies are 
reflective of the macro-level.105 It therefore escapes the lack of short-
term differentiation between algorithms’ pro- and anti-competitive 
effects, as this paper will express how long-term economic insights may 
complement the formalistic application of Article 101(1). 
 
A second criticism arises from an apparent scepticism towards 
accumulated market power. Indeed, Miksch conceptualised 
competition as-if, requiring ‘that firms refrain from conduct that would 
be unavailable to them if they had no monopoly power’.106 It may be 
argued that Article 102 TFEU, which prohibits ‘abuse by one or more 
undertakings’,107 could be applied to firms’ collective dominance. In 
Piau v Commission, the court explicitly outlined its potential use to 
remedy tacit collusion; but neither the case nor Commission Guidelines 
voice how.108 Indeed, where barriers are low, ‘collective’ dominance 
could refer to potentially hundreds of firms, none of which boast 
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sizeable market shares but all of which enjoy the same transparency and 
reactionary mechanisms to maintain a tacitly supra-competitive status 
quo. 
 
More broadly, however, second-wave ordoliberal thought has 
substituted competition as if for ‘competition as a discovery procedure’, 
as put forward by Hayek.109 This approach reaffirms static efficiencies 
as inadequate, instead favouring longer term realisations of consumer 
welfare. This will likely involve a process of creative destruction:110 
provided barriers to entry are not infeasibly high, algorithms’ 
development of dynamic prices will create market power, attracting 
innovative entrants who will erode incumbents’ market shares. In the 
medium-to-long term, consumers would benefit from the rational 
behaviour of economic parties in the free market as capacity expands 
and prices are lowered. 
 
This does not solve the problem, but outlines that market structures are 
undeserving of an anti-competitive presumption. 111  Consequently, 
Article 101 should be mobilised where broader economic discovery 
suggests firms may be making supra-competitive profits by algorithmic 
means. The expansion of Article 101(1), however, is not disconnected 
from earlier conclusions rejecting the short-termism of state 
intervention. Whilst price-fixing is per se illegal in US antitrust law, 
irrespective of contextual factors, EU policy offers a defence within the 
bifurcated architecture of the TFEU, under Article 101(3). 112  This 
makes Article 101(1) inapplicable where an agreement or concertation 
‘contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to 
promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a 
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fair share of the resulting benefit’ without imposing restrictions on the 
firms which are not indispensable to these benefits and do not afford 
the ‘possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial 
part of the products in question’.113 Colombo therefore supports the 
expansion of this defence in line with broader enforcement powers, as 
this paper has already recognised the potential for pricing algorithms to 
realise the criteria of the defence through long-term price reductions, 
lower search costs, and by accounting for capacity constraints.114 This 
is objectively valuable to the DSM’s facilitating digital services: 
offering the most pertinent legal landscape to publicly justifying the 
pro-competitive effects of algorithms whilst not, in the process, 
deterring their development and application. Price increases are not 
anti-competitive per se, but may indicate long-term dynamic effects 
benefitting consumer and commercial parties – maximising digital 
growth. 
 
Regulation 1/2003 impedes this reform. Through its ‘self-assessment’ 
regime, firms bear the onus of ascertaining their own adherence to 
competition law. 115  Bailey observes the consequent deficiency of 
Article 101(3), resulting in its infrequent, and negative, application.116 
Scant guidance suggests that it establishes a presumption firmly against 
firms allegedly breaching Article 101(1),117 but whilst risk management 
is to be expected, it cannot substitute the positive application. Indeed, 
firms may actively inform the economic constitution and efficiencies 
by justifying their long-term position and market behaviour. 
Accordingly, Article 101(3) may expand the state’s market 
comprehension, to be mobilised after Article 101(1) is invoked – 
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necessitating Commission-published guidance to this effect. 
4.5! The burden of proof and presumptions of innocence 
Article 2 of Regulation 1/2003 outlines the burden of proof for Article 
101(1) as resting upon the authority alleging the infringement, and that 
the undertaking(s) must then bear the burden of proving the defence is 
adequately fulfilled.118 In MasterCard v Commission the court held that 
there was not ‘an excessive burden of proof on the applicants by 
requiring empirical proof to be adduced’ vis-à-vis Article 101’s 
bifurcated architecture between clause (1) and (3).119 At first glance, 
this approach appears reasonable: undertakings may challenge 
authorities’ claims of an anti-competitive impact with pro-competitive, 
to neutral net-effect.120 This is superficial, however. Jones and Sufrin 
observe the court’s wide deference towards authorities’ use of lighter, 
qualitative factors to discharge their burden, 121  provided they are 
factually accurate and conclusions may be drawn,122 where firms must 
objectively quantify their defence.123 Although the limbs of Article 101 
are structurally balanced, therefore, they are substantively imbalanced. 
As the burden of proof funnels to firms only at second instance, it is 
inherently restrictive and imposes a presumption of guilt, in 
contravention of the in dubio pro reo principle. 
 
 
 
 
118 Council Regulation (n 115) art 2. 
119 Case T-111/08 MasterCard and Others v European Commission [2012] ECLI:EU:T 
260 [40]. 
120 ibid [85]. 
121 Such as consumer responses and documentary evidence, viz Case T-342/07 Ryanair 
Holdings plc v European Commission [2010] II-03457 [163]. 
122 Alison Jones and Brenda Sufrin, EU Competition Law: Text, Cases, and Materials 
(6th edn, OUP 2016) 251. 
123 Alfonso Lamadrid de Pablo, ‘The Double Duality of Two-sided Markets’ 
(Presentation at Pros and Cons Conference, Stockholm, 28 November 2014) 
<https://chillingcompetition.com/2014/11/28/the-double-duality-of-two-sided-
markets/> accessed 28 April 2019, 12. 
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Although the Commission generally holds claims to a standard of proof 
on the balance of probabilities,124 Article 101(1) requires ‘evidence to 
support the firm conviction’. 125  Consequently, competition policy 
seemingly errs towards a criminal standard, which accentuates the need 
for due process and for an assumption of innocence to apply to 
commercial parties. This supports Kaliniti’s proposal that the entire 
burden of proof rests upon competition authorities – leaving 
undertakings with only an evidential burden. Rationalised with 
ordoliberal proposals, the expanded definition of agreement would be 
tempered by an active and complimentary approach towards firms’ 
economic evidence within the framework of legal formalism – 
promoting a more cautious approach which eschews a funnelling 
relationship between Articles 101(1) and 101(3) and consequent over-
enforcement. 126  This ensures an effective balance towards firms’ 
respective and long-term dynamic-pricing and, where this is doubted, 
scope for authorities to mobilise the economic constitution at risk of not 
discharging their burden. 
5! Conclusion 
Pricing algorithms do not necessitate vast swathes of reform in EU 
competition policy. Neither can they be left entirely unregulated for fear 
of consumer welfare being undermined. This paper has established that, 
in the case of explicit collusion, current policy has proven adequate at 
least to the extent that it is clearly captured by Article 101 TFEU Ð as 
demonstrated by the case of Trod Ltd. The broad definition of 
agreement may be transplanted with little confusion from the offline 
Ôsmoke-filled roomÕ to online correspondence. It has demonstrated, 
even, that less direct communication such as Ôcheap talkÕ enjoys 
 
124 This is not explicitly stated, though may be inferred from the ‘neutral’ net effect and 
there being no reason to suspect otherwise, Napp Pharmaceuticals Holdings Ltd v 
Director General of Fair Trading [2002] CAT 1 [112]. 
125 Case T-67/00 JFE Engineering v European Commission [2004] II-02501 [57]. 
126 Andriani Kalintiri, ‘The Allocation of the Legal Burden of Proof in Article 101 
TFEU Cases: A ‘Clear’ Rule with Not-So-Clear Implications’ (2015) 34(1) Yearbook 
of European Law 232, 253. 
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stronger economic rationale for legal intervention as a concerted 
practice under current policy.  
 
Nevertheless, Trod offers telling lessons. Although the technology 
failed to maintain the algorithmic cartel at times, such imperfections 
may be remedied in future. It was only due to partiesÕ correspondence 
that the veil could be (partially) lifted on the ongoing collusion. As 
pricing algorithms facilitate increasing concertation in lieu of 
agreement, current policy may have difficulty in detecting and 
capturing cartels. This will require the European Commission to better 
define concerted practices as a classification in its own right, where it 
is presently dually classified with agreement at the expense of clarity. 
More significantly, however, the degree(s) of separation between 
human agents and the collusive effects of algorithms has demonstrated 
the inadequacy of the EU Fines Notice in disgorging the extent to which 
cartelists benefit. This risks a failure to deter algorithmic cartels and, in 
fact, incentivises cartelsÕ higher supra-competitive equilibria. This 
paper therefore calls for a reformulation of the current approach. It 
proposes one which forensically audits cartelistsÕ accounts to ascertain 
and disgorge supra-competitive profits, thereby ensuring certainty in 
the sanctions against them as an effective deterrent. Altogether, this 
suggests that algorithmic cartels are not so comfortably captured by 
current policy but sitting at its Rubicon Ð inviting policymakersÕ 
attention to tackle future instances of explicit collusion. 
 
The most precipitous issue presented within this paper, however, is the 
ability of algorithms to promote tacit collusion as a rational business 
decision. Emulating the oligopoly problem, they risk expanding it from 
markets of just a few competitors to those of many. The literature 
reveals no remedial consensus, as proposals are torn between biases on 
market structure and efficiency and, more intolerably, consumer 
welfare at the expense of proper economic consideration. These 
proposals fail to account for the distinction between algorithmsÕ pro- 
and anti-competitive effects, which are behavioural in nature. 
Consequently, this paper proposes removing these issues from the 
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equation. By dismissing Ôwelfare firstÕ economics as undesirably short 
term, it promotes an ordoliberal approach to escape the impasse. This 
approach would maintain and protect healthy competition for the sake 
of competition: framing firmsÕ conduct within an economic constitution 
at first instance, but protecting consumer welfare as a consequence at 
second instance. 
 
An ordoliberal approach must be implemented predictably and 
judiciously. As the TFEU is a product of early ordoliberal sentiment in 
the EU, however, the groundwork already exists in current policy. 
Consequently, a proper economic constitution must afford competition 
authorities broader powers to capture perceived anti-competitive 
behaviour by expanding the breadth of Article 101(1). To differentiate 
the pro- and anti-competitive impacts of algorithms, however, Article 
101(3) must be reconceptualised as a viable defence to Article 101(1) 
to justify long-term market behaviour and rational economic decisions 
with pro-competitive effects. As a result, whilst competition authorities 
must retain their ability to bring initial claims, they should bear the onus 
of the entire burden of proof to ensure that firms are not subject to 
presumptions against them for rational conduct within the free market. 
To this end, a cautious but complementary approach balancing 
authoritiesÕ shorter term concerns with firmsÕ long-term efficiencies 
may be produced: curtailing over-enforcement, maintaining the 
presumption of innocence, and not rewarding wanton interventionism 
by the state. 
